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THE MILITARY OPERATIONS ON THE WHITE OAK
ROAD, VIRGINIA, MARCH 31, 1865.
HE operations of the Fifth Corps on the White Oak Road

on the 31st of March, 1865, were more serious in purpose
T
and action than has been generally understood ; and with refer

<

ence either to their intended and possible results, or to their
actual effect upon the ensuing eventful campaign, they are
entitled to better consideration than they have yet received.
Moreover, the peculiar complications attending them, bearing
upon the personal issues which made a memorable episode of
the battle of Five Forks on the following day, give these inci
dents a picturesque interest as well as historic value. I have
thought that a recital based on personal knowledge of these
operations and intimate association with some of the chief act
ors in them, might tend to draw the facts from the obscurity in
which they have been left in official reports and professed his
tories of the last campaign of the Army of the Potomac ; and
while necessarily exhibiting, might perhaps tend to clear up,
some of the confusion in which they have been involved by the
peculiar circumstances under which this record has been pre
sented to the public judgment.
It had not been the habit in the Fifth Corps to invite or
encourage detailed reports on the part of subordinates; and in
the rush and pressure of this intense campaign there was less
opportunity or care than ever for such matters, while the im
pressiveness of the momentous close left little disposition to mul
tiply words upon subordinate parts or participants. The fact
also of an early change in the grand tactics of the campaign con
fused the significance, and sometimes the identity, of important
movements ; and the change of commanders in the crisis of its
chief battle induced consequences which, even in official reports
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and testimony, affected the motive for sharply defining actions
where personal concern had come to be an embarrassing factor.
At all events, the immediate reports of those days are meager
in the extreme; and very much of what has come out since has
been under the disadvantage of being elicited as ex parte testi
mony before military courts where the highest military officers
of the government were parties, and the attitudes of plaintiff
and defendant almost inevitably biased expression.
It will be distinctly borne in mind that the view here pre
sented is of things as they appeared to us who were concerned
in them as subordinate commanders. This is a chapter of
experiences,— including in this term not only what was done, but
what was known and said and thought and felt, not to say suf
fered, and showing withal a steadfast purpose, patience and spirit
of obedience deserving of record even if without recompense.
In order to throw all possible light on the otherwise inexpli
cable confusions of this day, I have incorporated with my orig
inal account some evidence not before available now brought
out in recent volumes of the Records of the War. Such refer
ence to what was not then within our knowledge I have endeav
ored to make perfectly distinct, so as not to disturb the essen
tial unity of a picture seen from the interior of what may with
literal appropriateness be called the transactions of that day.
Yet I find embarrassments in approaching this narration.
These facts, however simple, cannot but have some bearing on
points which have been drawn into controversy on the part of
those who were dear to me as commanders and companions in
arms, and who have grown still dearer in the intimacies of friend
ship since the war, and in the fact that they are no longer here
to speak for themselves. I feel, therefore, under increased
responsibility in presenting these matters, assuring myself that
I know of no bias of personality or partisanship which should
make me doubtful of my ability to tell the truth as I saw and
knew it to be, or distrust my judgment in forming an opinion.
Another embarrassment is in the fact that the operations of
this day are closely related parts of a series of movements which,

THE WHITE OAK ROAD.

5

whether continuous or broken, were intended to be directed
towards a distinct objective ; so that no one portion can be fully
understood without reference to the rest, both before and after,
and to the great controlling motive of the whole.
Indulge me, therefore, with your patience while I gather up
as shortly as possible, the main preliminaries necessary to a fair
understanding of the operations on the White Oak Road. Lee’s
army during the previous winter had become much weakened
by lack of supplies, desertions,1 and general demoralization of
the Confederate cause, and Grant was determined to take deci
sive measures to break the whole Confederate hold on Virginia.
He planned a vigorous movement to cut Lee’s communications,
and also those of Richmond; and at the same time to turn the
right flank of Lee’s entrenched line before Petersburg and break
up his army. For the first of these objects he was to send Sheri
dan, now commanding “ The Middle Military Division,” with the
cavalry of the Army of the Shenandoah, two divisions, under
General Merritt, and the cavalry division now commanded
by General Crook, formerly belonging to the Army of the Poto
mac. For the second purpose he was to send out, with Sheriidan though not under his command, the Fifth and Second
Corps of the Army of the Potomac,— General Meade, its com
mander, accompanying the movement. The former places of
these corps on the left of our entrenchments before Petersburg,
were to be taken by troops of the Army of the James. On the
right of these our Sixth and Ninth Corps were to hold their old
positions in front of Petersburg, ready to break through the
enemy’s works if they should be stripped somewhat of troops
by the necessity of meeting our assault on their right.
The scope of Grant’s intentions may be understood from an
extract from his orders to Sheridan, March 28, 1865 : —

“ The Fifth Army Corps will move by the Vaughan Road at three
A. M. to-morrow morning. The Second moves at about nine A. M.
1 The desertions in Pickett’s Division alone from March 9 to 18 were 512 men.
Rebellion Records, Serial 97, p. 1332, 1353. And they were shooting deserters at
that time. Ibid. p. 1367.
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.............Move your cavalry at as early an hour as you can, . . . and
passing to or through Dinwiddie, reach the right and rear of the
enemy as soon as you can. It is not the intention to attack the
enemy in his entrenched position, but to force him out, if possible.
Should he come out and attack us, or get himself where he can be
attacked, move in with your entire force in your own way, and with
full reliance that the army will engage or follow the enemy as cir
cumstances will dictate. I shall be on the field, and will probably be
able to communicate with you. Should I not do so, and you find
that the enemy keeps within his main entrenched line, you may cut
loose and push for the Danville Road. If you find it practicable, I
would like you to cross the Southside Road between Petersburg and
Burkesville, and destroy it to some extent............. After having accom
plished the destruction of the two railroads, which are now the only
avenues of supply to Lee’s Army, you may return to this army or go
on into North Carolina and join General Sherman........... ”
General Grant evidently intended to rely more on tactics
than strategy in this campaign. In his personal letter to Gen
eral Sherman, of March 22, giving the details of his plans for
Sheridan’s movement, he adds : “ I shall start out with no dis
tinct view, further than bolding Lee’s forces from following
Sheridan. But I shall be along myself, and will take advantage
of anything that turns up.”
The general plan was that Sherman should work his way up
to Burkesville, and thus cut off Lee’s communications, and force
him to come out of his entrenchments and fight on equal terms.
Sherman says he and General Grant expected that one of them
would have to fight one more bloody battle. He also makes
the characteristic remark that his army at Goldsboro was
strong enough to fight Lee’s army and Johnston’s combined, if
Grant would come up within a day or two.1
1 Sherman’s Memoirs, Vol. II, p. 325. This seems to imply a reflection on the
fighting qualities of the Army of the Potomac, as at that time Sherman’s army did
not exceed in number the Army of the Potomac but by about six thousand men.
But it must be remembered that the Army of the Potomac confronted an enemy
covered by entrenched works for sixteen miles,— a circumstance which gave the
Confederates the great advantage of three to one in effective numbers.
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The ground about to be traversed by us is flat and swampy,
and cut up by sluggish streams, which, after every rain, become
nearly impassable. The soil is a mixture of clay and sand,
quite apt in wet weather to take the character of sticky mire
or of quicksands. The principal roads for heavy travel have to
be corduroyed or overlaid with plank. The streams for the
most part find their way southeasterly into the tributaries of
the Chowan River. Some, however, flow northeasterly into the
waters of the Appomattox. Our available route was along the
divide of these waters.
The principal road leading out westerly from Petersburg is
the Boydton Plank Road ; for the first ten miles nearly parallel
with the Appomattox, and distant from it from three to six
miles. The Southside Railroad is between the Boydton Road
and the river. South of the Boydton is the Vaughan Road ;
the first section lying in rear of our main entrenchments, but
from our extreme left at Hatcher’s Run, inclining towards the
Boydton Road, being only two miles distant from it at Dinwiddie Court House. Five miles east of this place the Quaker
Road, called by persons of another mood, the “ Military Road,”
crosses the Vaughan and leads northerly into the Boydton
Road midway between Hatcher’s Run and Gravelly Run, which
at their junction became Rowanty Creek.
A mile above the intersection of the Quaker Road with the
Boydton is the White Oak Road, leading off from the Boydton
at right angles westerly, following the ridges between the
small streams and branches forming the headwaters of Hatch
er’s and Gravelly Runs, through and beyond the “ Five Forks.”
This is a meeting-place of roads, the principal of which, called
the Ford Road, crosses the White Oak at aright angle, leading
from a station on the Southside Railroad, three miles north, to
Dinwiddie Court House, six miles south.
The enemy’s main line of entrenchments west from Peters
burg covers, of course, the important Boydton Plank Road ; but
only so far as Hatcher’s Run, where at Burgess’ Mill, their
entrenchments leave this and follow the White Oak Road for
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some two miles, and then cross it, turning to the north and fol
lowing the Claiborne Road, which leads to Sutherland station
on the Southside Railroad ten miles distant from Petersburg,
covering this road till it strikes Hatcher’s Run, about a mile
higher up. This “ return ” northerly forms the extreme right
of the enemy’s entrenched line.
When the instructions for this campaign reached us, all were
animated with confidence of quick success. If Lee’s lines
before Petersburg were held in place, it would be easy work to
cut his communications, turn his right, and roll him back upon
Petersburg or Richmond ; if, on the other hand, his main lines
were stripped to resist our attack, our comrades in the old lines
would make short work of Lee’s entrenchments and his army.
We were all good friends,— those who were to constitute the
turning column. Humphreys of the Second Corps had for
merly commanded a division in the Fifth; Warren of the Fifth
had commanded the Second; Miles in the Second had won his
spurs in the Fifth ; Meade, commanding the army, had been
corps commander of the Fifth ; the cavalry division of our
army, now to go to Sheridan, had been our pet and pride;
Sheridan was an object of admiration and awe.
At daylight on the twenty-ninth of March the Fifth Corps
moved out toward the enemy’s right. As the movement was
intended to mask its destination by a considerable detour to the
rear, our column first moved southward to Arthur’s Swamp,
crossing the Rowanty at Monk’s Bridge, and thence by way of
the Old Stage Road into and down the Vaughan. My brigade,
being the advance of the First Division, reached the Chapple
House, about two miles from Dinwiddie, early in the forenoon,
encountering only a few cavalry pickets. Sheridan, with the
cavalry, moving by a still exterior route, reached Dinwiddie
Court House only at about five o’clock in the afternoon, pressing
before him also the enemy’s pickets.
Our whole division1 had arrived at the Chapple House when
1 Griffin’s Division at the opening of the campaign numbered in all present for
duty, of all kinds, 6,547 men. Of these the First Brigade numbered 1,750; the
Second, about the same; the Third, upwards of 3,000.
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at about noon my command was ordered to retrace its steps by
the Vaughan to the Quaker Road, and push up towards the
salient of the enemy’s works near Burgess’ Mill. We soon
found this road better entitled to its military than its Quaker
appellation. The enemy’s skirmishers were pressed back upon
their reserves in a fairly well fortified position on the north bank
of Gravelly Run, where they had destroyed the bridge to check
our advance. Fording the run and forcing the position, we
soon developed a strong line which had entrenched itself as an
advanced post to cover the important point at Burgess’ Mill,
consisting of Grade’s, Ransom’s, Wallace’s and Wise’s Brigades,
of Bushrod Johnson’s Division,1 under Lieutenant General R. H.
Anderson. After stubborn fighting for over two hours, involving
a loss to us of one hundred and sixty-seven killed and wounded,
including some of our most valued officers, and a much heavier
loss to the enemy of whom more than one hundred killed
and fifty wounded, with one hundred and sixty prisoners taken
by a sudden countercharge, fell into our hands, and aided late in
the action by portions of Gregory’s and Bartlett’s brigades,
which had then just arrived, and by Battery B, 4th U. S. artil
lery, we pushed the enemy quite back to the White Oak Road,
and into their entrenchments behind it. The Second Corps now
came up and formed on our right.
With customary cognizance of our purposes and plans, Lee
had on the twenty-eighth, ordered General Fitz Hugh Lee, with
his division of cavalry, from the extreme left of his lines to the
extreme right in the vicinity of Five Forks, to oppose what he
believed to be Sheridan’s intention of cutting his communica
tions by way of the Southside Railroad.2 Such despatch had
Fitz Lee made that on the evening of the twenty-ninth he had
1 Reported to be about 6.000 strong. Rebellion Records, Serial 97, page 116.
2 Longstreet had advised Lee (March 28) that Grant would try to take Rich
mond by raiding on his communications rather than by attacking his lines of works,
and suggesting putting a sufficient force in the field to prevent this. He says
“ the greater danger is from keeping too close within our trenches.” Rebellion
Records, Serial 97, page 1360. This advice was exactly in the line of what Grant
desired as his best opportunity. Longstreet’s discussion of the situation is inter
esting as given in “ Manassas to Appomattox,” page 588.
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arrived at Sutherland Station, within six miles of Five Forks,
and about that distance from our fight that afternoon on the
Quaker Road. Pickett’s Division, consisting of the brigades
of Stuart, Hunton, Corse and Terry, about five thousand
strong, was sent to the entrenchments along the Claiborne
Road, and Roberts’ Brigade of North Carolina cavalry, to picket
the White Oak Road from the Claiborne to Five Forks.
On the thirtieth, the Fifth Corps, relieved by the Second,
moved to the left along the Boydton Road, advancing its left
towards the right of the enemy’s entrenchments on the White
Oak Road. Lee, also, apprehensive for his right, sent
McGowan’s South Carolina Brigade and McRae’s North Caro
lina, of Hill’s Corps, to strengthen Bushrod Johnson’s Division
in the entrenchments there; but took two of Johnson’s brigades
— Ransom’s and Wallace’s — with three brigades of Pickett’s
Division (leaving Hunton’s in the entrenchments), to go with
Pickett to reenforce Fitz Hugh Lee at Five Forks. W. H. F.
Lee’s Division of cavalry, about one thousand five hundred men,
and Rosser’s, about one thousand,1 were also ordered to Five
Forks. These reenforcements did not reach Five Forks until
the evening of the thirtieth.
The precise details of these orders and movements were, of
course, not known to General Grant nor to any of his subordi
nates. But enough had been developed on the Quaker Road
to lead Grant to change materially his original purpose of mak
ing the destruction of the railroads the principal objective of
Sheridan’s movements. At the close of our fight there, Grant
had despatched Sheridan: “Our line is now unbroken from
11 leave these figures as I had them from reports at the time. General Fitz
Hugh Lee states in his testimony before the Warren Court of Inquiry that his
division numbered about 1,300; W. H. F. Lee’s, about 1,000; and Rosser’s, 900.
(Records, page 474.) But General W. H. F. Lee testifying before the same
court gives his numbers as between 1,700 and 1,800. (Same, page 530.) His
command in ordinary times seems to have been much larger. General Hum
phreys quotes the morning report of February 20, 1865, showing for W. H. F.
Lee’s command, 3,935 sabers, and Fitz Lee’s, 1,825. (Virginia Campaign, page
434, Appendix L.)
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Appomattox to Dinwiddie. I now feel like ending the matter,
if possible, before going back. I do not want you, therefore,
to cut loose and go after the enemy’s roads at present. In the
morning push around the enemy, if you can, and get on to his
right rear. The movements of the enemy’s cavalry may, of
course, modify your action. We will act together as one army
here, until it is seen what can be done with the enemy.”
The effect of this message reached to something more than
a measure of tactics. It brought Sheridan at once to Grant.
It will be borne in mind that he was not under the orders of
Meade, but an independent commander, subject to Grant alone.
His original orders contemplated his handling his command as
a flying column, independently of others — all the responsibility
and all the glory being his own. The new instructions would
bring him to act in conjunction with the Army of the Potomac,
and render quite probable under army regulations and usages
his coming under temporary command of General Meade, his
senior in rank,— a position we do not find him in during this
campaign. The logic of the new situation involved some
interesting corollaries beyond the direct issue of arms.
It was a dark and dismal night, that twenty-ninth of March,
on the Quaker Road. The chilling rain poured down, soaking
the fields and roads and drenching the men stretched on the
ground, worn, wounded and dying, all alike shrouded in ghastly
gloom. Here and there with strange, will-o’-the-wisp motion,
some ministering lantern sailing and sinking low in its quest of
flickering life, shone weirdly through the mist and mirk,— one
knew not whether near or far. Before morning the roads were
impassable for wagons or artillery, and nearly so for the ambu
lances that came up ghost-like in the shivering dawn.
Meanwhile, not far in rear of this scene, at General Grant’s
headquarters, Sheridan was holding long and close conference
with him, having ridden up through the rain and mud immedi
ately on receiving the message announcing the change of plan.
All that is known of this outside is that at the end Sheridan was
directed to gain possession of Five Forks early in the morning.
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He could easily have taken possession of that before;for all the
afternoon and night of the twenty-ninth, there was nothing
to oppose him there but the right wing of Roberts’ slender
brigade, picketing the White Oak Road. But when he received
a positive order to secure that point on the morning of the
thirtieth, he seems to have moved so late and moderately that
Fitz Hugh Lee had time to march from Sutherland Station to
Five Forks, and thence half-way to Dinwiddie Court House to
meet him ; and even then, attacking with a single division,
although this outnumbered the enemy by a thousand men,1 he
permitted his demonstration on Five Forks, to be turned into a
reconnaissance half-way out,2 his advance being checked at the
forks of the Ford and Boisseau Roads, where it remained all
night and until itself attacked the next morning.3 It is true
that the roads and fields were heavy with rain; but this did not
prevent our two infantry corps from moving forward and estab
lishing themselves in front of the White Oak Road, in face of
considerable opposition ; nor hinder Lee from zealously strength
ening the right of his lines, and pressing forward his reenforce
ments of infantry and cavalry to Fitz Hugh Lee at Five Forks,
where they arrived at about sunset. What we cannot under
stand is why previous to that time General Sheridan, with thir
teen thousand cavalry,4 had not found it practicable to make an
effective demonstration on Five Forks, covered all the morning
only by what few men Roberts had there picketing the White
Oak Road, and after that time, all day, only by Fitz Hugh Lee
with eighteen hundred cavalry.
1 General Devin’s Division numbered, according to returns of March 30, 169
officers and 2,830 men, present for duty.
2General Merritt’s despatch of March 30. Rebellion Records: Serial 97, page
326.
3 General Fitz Hugh Lee’s testimony. Warren Court Records, Vol. 1, page 469.
4 This figure is what was understood by us at the time. General Humphreys,
noted for painstaking accuracy, says in his “ Virginia Campaign of 1864 and ’65”
the numbers of Sheridan’s cavalry present for duty March 31, 1865 were 611 offi
cers and 13,200 enlisted men. (Appendix, p. 433.) The official returns for that
month, as compiled from subordinate returns, show for Sheridan’s cavalry, exclu
sive of artillery, present for duty,
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Early on the morning of the thirty-first the Fifth Corps had
all advanced northerly beyond the Boydton Road towards the
enemy at the junction of the White Oak and Claiborne Roads :
Ayres, with the Second Division, in advance, about six hundred
yards from this junction ; Crawford, with the Third Division, on
Ayres’ right rear in echelon with him, about six hundred yards
distant; and Griffin, with the First Division, in position about
thirteen hundred yards in rear of a prolongation of Craw
ford’s line to the left, entirely out of sight of both, owing to
woods and broken ground, but within what was thought to be
supporting distance. This position was along the southeast
bank of a swampy branch of Gravelly Run, half a mile north of
the Boydton Road, and a mile and a half south of the White
Oak Road. Miles’ Division of the Second Corps had extended
to the left on the Boydton Road to connect with Griffin.
My command was the extreme left of our lines ; my own
brigade along the difficult branch of Gravelly Run, facing
towards Ayres, with Gregory’s Brigade (which had reported to
me for this campaign) “refused”—bent back at right angles
so as to face westerly — along a country road leading from the
Boydton to the Claiborne Road ; a portion of the artillery of the
division being placed also in my lines to strengthen the defense
of that flank, where we had reason to believe the enemy, after
Merritt’s command, 373 officers; 7,138 men, = 7,511
Crook’s Division,
210 officers; 5,625 men, =5,835
“
12,763 “
13,346
(Rebellion Records, Serial 97, p. 391.)
For the month of April 1865 the official returns show for the above:
Merritt’s command, 400 officers, 7,894 men, = 8,294
Crook’s command, 220 officers, 2,715 men, = 2,935

Totals: 583

Totals: 620

“
10,609 “
11,229
(Rebellion Records, Serial 97, p. 1043.)
In a paper presented before the Warren Court of Inquiry, understood to be a
copy of General Sheridan’s official report, he states the number of his effective
command at the opening of this campaign to be: Merritt’s command 5,700, and
Crook’s command, 3,300; a total of 9,000. He may have had in mind the effective
numbers when dismounted; a fourth of the men being kept back holding horses
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their old fashion, were very likely to make a dash upon our left
while we were maneuvering to turn their right.
General Grant, understanding from General Sheridan that he
was on the White Oak Road, near Five Forks, on the afternoon
of the thirtieth, had replied to him that his position on this
road was of very great importance, and concluded this answer
with these words : “ Can you not push up towards Burgess’
Mills on the White Oak Road ? ” 1
General Grant’s wishes, as now understood, were that we
should gain possession of the White Oak Road in our front.
This was indicated in a despatch from him March 30, to General
Meade, the purport of which was known to us and had much
to do with shaping our energies for action. The despatch was
the following:
“As Warren and Humphreys advance, thus shortening their line, I
think the former had better move by the left flank as far as he can
stretch out with safety, and cover the White Oak Road if he can.
This will enable Sheridan to reach the Southside Road by Ford’s
Road, and, it may be, double the enemy up, so as to drive him out
of his works south of Hatcher’s Run.”
In accordance with this understanding, Ayres had made a
careful examination of the situation in his front, upon the
results of which General Warren had reported to Generals
Meade and Grant that he believed he could, with his whole
corps, gain possession of the White Oak Road. This proposi
tion was made in face of the information of Grant’s order of
7.40 this morning, that owing to the heavy rains the troops
were to remain substantially as they were, but that three days’
more rations should be issued to the Fifth Corps; an intima
tion of a possible cutting loose from our base of supplies for a
time.
Griffin’s Division, being entrusted with a double duty — that
of guarding the exposed left flank of the Fifth and Second
1 Sheridan’s despatch to Grant, March 30, 2.45 P. M., and Grant’s reply thereto ;
Records, Warren Court of Inquiry, Vol. II, page 1309. It afterwards transpired
that Sheridan’s cavalry did not long hold this position. Grant’s despatch to
Meade, March 31, Rebellion Records, Serial 97, p. 339.
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Corps, and that of being in readiness to render prompt assist
ance in case of trouble arising from the demonstrations against
the White Oak Road front — our adjustments had to be made
for what in familiar speech is termed a “ ticklish situation.”
Vague rumors from the direction of Five Forks added to what
we knew of the general probabilities, justified us in consider
able anxiety. There was a queer expression of Griffin’s face
when he showed me a copy of a message from Grant to Sheridan,
late the evening before, which gave us the comical satisfaction
of knowing that our inward fears had good outside support.
This was what we thus enjoyed: “From the information I
have sent you of Warren’s position, you will see that he is in
danger of being attacked in the morning. If such occurs, be
prepared to push up with all your force to assist him.” The
morning had now come. It is needless to remark that there
was no lethargy in the minds of any on that left flank of ours
in a situation so critical, whether for attack or defense.
It may seem strange that in such a state of things Warren
should have made the suggestion for a movement to his front.,
But he was anxious, as were all his subordinates, to strike a
blow in the line of our main business; which was to turn Lee’s
right and break up his army. Wet and worn and famished as
all were, we were alive to the thought that promptness and
vigor of action would at all events determine the conditions
and chances of the campaign. And if this movement did not
involve the immediate turning of Lee’s right in his entrench
ments, it would secure the White Oak Road to the west of
them, which Grant had assured Sheridan was of so much im
portance, and would enable us to hold Lee’s right in check, so
that Sheridan could either advance on the White Oak Road
towards us and Burgess’ Mill, as Grant had asked him to do, or
make a dash on the Southside Railroad, and cut their commu
nications and turn their right by a wider sweep, as Grant had
also suggested to him to do.
Late in the forenoon Warren received through General Webb,
chief of staff, the following order : “ General Meade directs that
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should you determine by your reconnaissance that you can gain
possession of, and hold the White Oak Road, you are to do so,
notwithstanding the order to suspend operations to-day.” This
gave a sudden turn to dreams. In that humiliation, fasting
and prayer, visions arose like prophecy of old. We felt the
swing and sweep ; we saw the enemy turned front and flank
across the White Oak Road; Sheridan flashing on our wheel
ing flank, cutting communications, enfilading the Claiborne en
trenchments ; our Second Corps over the main works, followed
up by our troops in the old lines seizing the supreme moment
to smash in the Petersburg defenses, scatter or capture all that
was left there of Lee’s army, and sweep away every menace to
the old flag between us and the James River. Mirage and
glamor of boyish fancy, measuring things by its heart ! Day
dreams of men familiar with disaster, drenched and famished,
but building, as ever, castles of their souls above the level river
of death !
It was with mingled feelings of mortification, apprehension
and desperation, that in the very ecstacy of these visions, word
came to us of Sheridan’s latest despatch to Grant the evening
before, that Pickett’s Division of infantry was deployed along
the White Oak Road, his right reaching to Five Forks ; and
the whole rebel cavalry was massing at that place, so that
Sheridan would be held in check by them instead of dashing
up, as was his wont, to give a cyclone edge to our wheeling
flank. Grant’s despatch to Meade, transmitting this, was a dire
disenchantment. The knell rang thus: “From this despatch
Warren will not have the cavalry support on his left flank that
I expected. He must watch closely his left flank.”
Although Grant had given out word that there should be no
movement of troops that day, Lee seems not so to have resolved.
Driven to seize every advantage or desperate expedient, he had
ordered four brigades, those of Wise, Gracie and Hunton, with
McGowan’s South Carolina Brigade, to move out from their
entrenchments, get across the flank of the Fifth Corps and
smash it in. We did not know this, but it was the very situation
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which Grant had made the occasion for attacking ourselves. It
was a strange coincidence, but it was to both parties a surprise.
This was the condition of things and of minds when the ad
vance ordered for the White Oak Road was put into execution.
Ayres advanced, soldier-like, as was his nature; resolute, firmhearted, fearing nothing; in truth not fearing quite enough.
Although he believed his advance would bring on a battle, he
moved without skirmishers, but in a wedge-like formation guard
ing both flanks. His First Brigade, commanded by the gallant
Winthrop, had the lead in line of battle, his right and rear sup
ported by the Third Brigade, that of Gwyn, who was accounted
a good fighter; and Denison’s Maryland Brigade formed in
column on Winthrop’s left and rear, ready to face outward by
the left flank in case of need ; while a brigade of Crawford’s
was held in reserve in rear of the center. This would seem to
be a prudent and strong formation of Ayres’ command. The
enemy’s onset was swift and the encounter sudden. The blow
fell without warning, enveloping Ayres’ complete front. It
appears that McGowan’s Brigade struck squarely on Winthrop’s
left flank, with an oblique fire also on the Maryland Brigade,
while the rest of the attacking forces struck on his front and
right. General Hunton1 says they were not expecting to
strike our troops so soon and that the attack was not made by
usual orders, but that on discovering our advance so close upon
them, a gallant lieutenant in his brigade sprung in front of his
line, waving his sword with the shout, “ Follow me, boys;”
whereupon all three brigades on their right dashed forward
to the charge. Winthrop was overwhelmed and his supports
demoralized. All he could hope for was to retire in good order.
This he exerted himself to effect. But this is not an easy
thing to do when once the retreat is started before a spirited
foe superior in numbers, or in the flush and rush of success.
In vain the gallant Denison strove to stem the torrent. A dis
abling wound struck down his brave example, and the effect of
this shows how much the moral forces have to do in sustaining
Records, Warren Court, p. 623.
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the physical. Brigade after brigade broke; that strange
impulse termed a “ panic ” took effect and the retreat became a
rout.
Ayres, like a roaring lion, endeavors to check the disorder,
and make a stand on each favoring crest and wooded ravine.
But in vain. His men stream past him. They come back on
Crawford’s veteran division and burst through it in spite of all
the indignant Kellogg can do, involving this also in the demoral
ization; and the whole crowd comes back reckless of everything
but to get behind the lines on the Boydton Road, plunging
through the swampy run, breaking through Griffin’s right,
where he and Bartlett reform them behind the Third Brigade.
The enemy pursuing, swarm down the bank opposite us, and
are met by a sharp fire of musketry and artillery which we had
made ready on hearing the noise of the retreat. We were
expecting them to fall in force on our left in Gregory’s front,
and I was riding along that line, anxious about this, when
General Warren and General Griffin came down at full speed,
both out of breath with their efforts to rally the panic-stricken
men whose honor was their own, and evidently under great
stress of feeling. Griffin breaks forth first, after his high
proof fashion: “General Chamberlain, the Fifth Corps is
eternally damned !” I essayed some pleasantry : “Not till you
are in heaven ! ” Griffin does not smile nor hear, but keeps right
on: “I tell Warren you will wipe out this disgrace, and that’s
what we’re here for.” Then Warren breaks out, with stirring
phrase, but uttered as if in a delirium of fever: “ General
Chamberlain, will you save the honor of the Fifth Corps ?
That’s all there is about it.” That appeal demanded a chival
rous response. Honor is a mighty sentiment, and the Fifth
Corps was dear to me. But my answer was not up to the key
note : I confess that. I was expecting every moment an attack
on my left flank now that the enemy had disclosed our situa
tion. And my little brigade had taken the brunt of things thus
far; but the day before the last, winning a hard-fought field
from which they had come off grievously thinned and torn and
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worn, and whence I had but hardly brought myself away. I
mentioned Bartlett, who had our largest and best brigade,
which had been but little engaged. “We have come to you ;
you know what that means,” was the only answer. " I’ll try it,
General; only don’t let anybody stop me except the enemy! ”
I had reason for that protest as things had been going. “I
will have a bridge ready here in less than an hour. You can’t
get men through this swamp in any kind of order,” says War
ren. “ It may do to come back on, General; it will not do to
stop for that now. My men will go straight through.” So at a
word the First Battalion of the 198th Pennsylvania, Major Glenn,
commanding, plunges into the muddy branch, waist deep, and
more,1 with cartridge boxes borne upon the bayonet sockets
above the turbid waters ; the Second Battalion keeping the
banks beyond clear of the enemy by their well-directed fire,
until the First has formed in skirmishing order and pressed up
the bank. I followed with the rest of the brigade in line of
battle and Gregory’s in column of regiments. The enemy fell
back without much resistance until finding supports on broken
strong ground, they made stand after stand. Griffin followed
with Bartlett’s Brigade, in reserve. In due time Ayres’ troops
got across and followed up on our left rear, while Crawford was
somewhere to our right and rear, but out of sight or reach after
we had once cleared the bank of the stream. It seems that
General Warren sent to General Meade the following despatch :
“I am going to send forward a brigade from my left, supported
by all I can get of Crawford and Ayres, and attack. . . .
This will take place about 1.45, if the enemy does not attack
sooner.” This was the only recognition or record we were to
have in official reports ; it was not all we were to achieve in
unwritten history.
At about this time Miles, of the Second Corps, had after the
fashion of that corps gone in handsomely in his front, somewhat
to the right of our division, and pressed so far out as to flank
1 General Warren states in his testimony before the Court of Inquiry that this
stream was sixty feet wide and four or five feet deep. Records, page 717.
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Wise’s Brigade on the left of the troops that had attacked
Ayres, and drove them back half-way to their starting-point.
This had the effect to induce the enemy in my front to retire
their line to a favorable position on the crest of a ravine where
they made another determined stand. After sharp fighting here
we drove them across an extensive field into some works they
seemed to have had already prepared, of the usual sort in
field operations,— logs and earth,— from which they delivered
a severe fire which caused the right of my line to waver. Tak
ing advantage of the slight shelter of a crest in the open field
I was preparing for a final charge, when I received an order to
halt my command and defend my position as best I could. I
did not like this much. It was a hard place to stay in. The
officer who brought me the order had his horse shot under him
as he delivered it. I rode back to see what the order meant.
I found General Griffin and General Warren in the edge of the
woods overlooking the field, and reported my plans. We had
already more than recovered the ground taken and lost by the
Second and Third Divisions. The Fifth Corps had been rap
idly and completely vindicated, and the question was now of
taking the White Oak Road, which had been the object of so
much wishing, and worrying. It was evident that things could
not remain as they were. The enemy would soon attack and
drive me back. And it would cost many men even to try to
withdraw from such a position. The enemy’s main works were
directly on my right flank, and how the intervening woods might
be utilized to cover an assault on that flank, none of us knew.
I proposed to put Gregory’s Brigade into those woods, by bat
talion in echelon by the left, by which formation he would take
in flank and reverse in succession any attacks on my right.
When Gregory should be well advanced I would charge the
works across the field with my own brigade. My plan being
approved, I instructed Gregory to keep in the woods, moving
forward with an inclination towards his left to keep him closed
in toward me, and at the same time to open the intervals in his
echelons so that he would be free to deliver a strong fire on his
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own front if necessary ; and the moment he struck any opposi
tion to open at once with full volleys and make all the demon
stration he could, and I would seize that moment to make a
dash at the works in my front. Had I known of the fact that
General Lee himself was personally directing affairs in our
front,11 might not have been so rash, or thought myself so cool.
Riding forward I informed my officers of my purpose and had
their warm support. Soon the roar of Gregory’s guns rose in
the woods like a whirlwind. We sounded bugles “ Forward,”
and that way we go ; mounted officers leading their commands ;
pieces at the right shoulder until at close quarters.
What we had to do could not be done by firing. This was
foot-and-hand business. We went with a rush ; not minding
ranks nor alignments ; but with open front to lessen loss from
the long-range rifles. Within effective range, — about three
hundred yards,— the sharp, cutting fire made us reel and shiver.
Now, quick or never ! On and over! The impetuous 185th
New York rolls over the enemy’s right, and seems to swallow
it up; the 198th Pennsylvania, with its fourteen companies, half
veterans, half soldiers “ born so,” swing in upon their left strik
ing Hunton’s Brigade in front; and for a few minutes there is
a seething wave of countercurrents, then rolling back leaving a
fringe of wrecks, and all is over. We pour over the works ; on
across the White Oak Road ; swing to the right and drive the
enemy into their entrenchments along the Claiborne road, and
then establish ourselves across the road facing northeast, and
take breath.2
Major Woodward in his history of the 198th Pennsylvania giv
ing a graphic outline of the last dash, closes with an incident I
had not recorded. “Onlyfor a moment,” he says, “ did the sud
den and terrible blast of death cause the right of the line to
waver. On they dashed, every color flying, officers leading,
1 Testimony of General Hunton and General McGowan ; Warren Court Records,
Vol. I, page 625 and 648.
2 General Hunton, since Senator from Virginia, said in his testimony before the
Warren Court, speaking of this charge, “ I thought it was one of the most gallant
things I had ever seen.” Records, Part I, page 625.
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right in among the enemy, leaping the breastworks,— a confused
struggle of firing, cutting, thrusting, a tremendous surge of
force, both moral and physical, on the enemy’s breaking lines,—
and the works were carried. Private Augustus Zieber captured
the flag of the 46th Virginia in mounting one of the para
pets, and handed it to General Chamberlain in the midst of the
melee, who immediately gave it back to him, telling him to keep
it and take the credit that belonged to him. Almost that entire
regiment was captured at the same time.” It scarcely need be
added that the man who captured that battle flag was sent with
it in person to General Warren, and that he received a medal
of honor from the Government.
In due time Gregory came up out of the woods his face
beaming with satisfaction at the result to which his solid work,
so faithfully performed, had been essential. His brigade was
placed in line along the White Oak Road on our right, and a
picket thrown out close up to the enemy’s works. This move
ment had taken three hours, and was almost a continuous
fight, with several crescendo passages, and a final cadence of
wild, chromatic sweeps settling into the steady key-note, thrilling
with the chords of its unwritten overtones and undertones. It
had cost us a hundred men, but this was all too great, of men
like these,— and for oblivion. It was to cost us something
more,— a sense of fruitlessness and thanklessness.
It seems that in the black moment, when our two divisions
were coming back in confusion, Meade had asked Grant to
have Sheridan strike the attacking force on their right and rear,
as he had been ordered to do in case Warren was attacked.
For we have Grant’s message to Meade, sent at 12.40, which is
evidently a reply : “ It will take so long to communicate with
Sheridan that he cannot be brought to cooperation unless he
comes up in obedience to orders sent him last night. I under
stood General Forsyth to say that as soon as another division
of cavalry got up, he would send it forward. It may be there
now. I will send to him again, at once.”
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So far, to all appearance, all was well. The Fifth Corps was
across the White Oak Road. General Grant’s wish that we
should extend our left across this road as near to the enemy as
possible, so that Sheridan could double up the enemy and drive
him north of Hatcher’s Run, had been literally fulfilled. It
had cost us three days’ hard work and hard fighting, and more
than two thousand men. It had disclosed vital points. Gen
eral Grant’s notice of all this as given in his Memoirs (Vol.
II, page 435), representing all these movements as subordi
nated to those of General Sheridan is the following: “There
was considerable fighting in taking up these new positions for
the Second and Fifth Corps, in which the Army of the James
had also to participate somewhat, and the losses were quite
severe. This is what was known as the battle of the White
Oak Road.”1
The understanding of this affair has been confused by the
impression that it was the Second Corps troops which attacked
and drove back the forces of the enemy that had driven in the
Second and Third Divisions of the Fifth Corps. In the com
plicated rush and momentous consummation of the campaign,
and particularly in the singular history of the Fifth Corps for
those days, in which corps and division and brigade command
ers were changed, there was no one specially charged with the
care of seeing to it that the movements of this corps in rela
tion to other corps were properly reported as to the important
points of time as well as of place. General Miles, doubtless,
supposed he was attacking the same troops that had repulsed
1 When the very assault we were in the act of making, or rather, of following
up, on the enemy’s right on the thirty-first of March, was triumphantly taken up
by General Miles on the second of April, after the disaster at Five Forks had
called away most of the defenders of the Claiborne entrenchments,— Generals
Anderson and Johnson, with Hunton’s, Wise’s, Grade’s and Fulton’s Brigades
being of the number,— and the whole rebel army was demoralized, General Grant,
now free to appreciate such action, despatches General Meade at once: “ Miles
has made a big thing of it, and deserves the highest praise for the pertinacity with
which he stuck to the enemy until he wrung from him victory.” Verily, some
thing besides circumstances can “ alter cases.”
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part of the Fifth Corps. He moved promptly when Griffin,
with infantry and artillery was checking the onrushing enemy
now close upon our front; and attacking in his own front,—
that of the Second Corps,— fought his way valiantly close up
to the enemy’s works in that part of their line. Miles reported
to Humphreys that he was "ahead of the Fifth Corps,” which
subsequently bore off to the left of him and left a wide inter
val. This expression must not be understood as direction in a
right line. It is used rather as related to the angular distance
between the Boydton and the White Oak Roads,— this being
less where Miles was, on the right, and widening by a large
angle towards the left, where the Fifth Corps was. It is as one
line is ahead of another when advanced in echelon ; or as a
ship tacking to windward with another is said to be “ahead ”
of the latter when she is on the weather beam of it. Miles
did not come in contact with a single regiment that had
attacked the Fifth Corps. He struck quite to the right of us
all, attacking in his own front. But it got into the reports
otherwise, and “ went up.” Grant accepted it as given ; and
so it has got into history, and never can be got out. General
Miles did not get ahead of the Fifth Corps that day, but he
came up gallantly on its flank and rendered it great assistance
by turning the flank of General Wise and keeping the enemy
from massing on our front. He reports the capture of the flag
of the 47th Alabama, a regiment of Law’s old brigade of Long
street’s Corps, which was nowhere near the front of the Fifth
Corps on this day.
In the investigations before the Court of Inquiry, General
Warren felt under the necessity of excusing himself from the
responsibility of the disastrous results of Ayres’ advance on
the morning of the thirty-first. He is at pains to show that he
did not intend an attack there, although he had suggested the
probable success of such a movement.1 What then was this
advance? Surely not to create a diversion in favor of Sheridan
before Dinwiddie. At all events, there was an endeavor to get
’Records, Warren Court, PartII, page 1525.
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possession of the White Oak Road. And that could not be
done without bringing on a battle, as Ayres said he knew, before
hand,1 and afterwards knew still better, and we also, unmistak
ably. Warren stated his intention correctly, no doubt; but then
was he aware as he should be, of the condition of things in
Ayres’ front ?
But, however this may have been, when Ayres’ advance was
repulsed, why was it felt necessary to recover that field and “ the
honor of the Fifth Corps ?” Unless it was the intention to take
forcible possession of the White Oak Road, the recovery of that
field was not a tactical necessity, but only,— if I may so speak,
— a sentimental necessity. And there was no more dishonor
in this reconnaissance,— if it was only that,— being driven back
than for Sheridan’s reconnaissance toward Five Forks to be
driven back upon Dinwiddie, for his conduct in which he
received only praise. It is evident that General Grant thought
an attack was somehow involved; for hearing of Ayres’ repulse,
he blames General Warren for not attacking with his whole corps,
and asks General Meade, “ What is to prevent him from pitching
in with his whole corps and attacking before giving him time to
entrench or retire in good order to his old entrenchments ? ”
This is exactly what was done, before receiving this suggestion ;
but it did not elicit approval, or even notice, from Grant or
Meade, or Warren. As things turned, Warren was put under
a strong motive to ignore this episode ; and as for Grant, he had
other interests in mind.
In our innocence we thought we had gained a great advantage. We had the White Oak Road, and were across it, and
as near to the enemy as possible, according to Grant’s wish.
Now we were ready for the consummate stroke, the achievement
of the object for which all this toil and trial had been undergone.
It needed but little more. The splendid Second Corps was
on our right, close up to the enemy’s works. We were more
than ready. If only Sheridan with but a single division of our
cavalry could disengage himself from his occupation before
1Testimony, Warren Court, Part I, page 247.
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Dinwiddie, so far away to our rear, and now so far off from any
strategic point where he had first been placed for the purpose
of raiding upon the Danville and Southside Railroads,— which
objective had been distinctly given up in orders by General
Grant,— if with his audacity and insistance Sheridan could have
placed himself in position to obey Grant’s order, and come
to Warren’s assistance when he was attacked, should dash up
between us and Five Forks, we would have swiftly inaugu
rated the beginning of the end, — Grant’s main wish and
purpose latest expressed to Sheridan, of ending matters here,
before he went back. But another, and by far minor objective
interposed. Instead of the cavalry coming to help us complete
our victories at the front, we were to go to the rescue of Sheri
dan at the rear.
Little did we dream that on the evening of the thirtieth Grant
had formed the intention of detaching the Fifth Corps to oper
ate with Sheridan in turning the enemy’s right. This was con
sistent, however, with the understanding in the midnight con
ference on the twenty-ninth. The proposition to Sheridan was
this : “ If your situation in the morning is such as to justify the
belief that you can turn the enemy’s right with the assistance
of a corps of infantry entirely detached from the balance of the
army, I will so detach the Fifth Corps and place the whole
under your command for the operation. Let me know early in
the morning as you can your judgment in the matter, and I
will make the necessary orders. . . . ” Precisely what War
ren had proposed to do at that very time on Gravelly Run, only
Sheridan would not have been in chief command. His assist
ance had however been promised to Warren in case he was
attacked. Sheridan replies to this on the morning of the thirtyfirst. “... If the ground would permit, I believe I could with
the Sixth Corps, turn the enemy’s left, or break through
his lines ; but I would not like the Fifth Corps to make such
an attempt.” By “ turning the enemy’s right,” and “ breaking
through his lines,” he meant only the isolated position at Five
Forks, where for the two days past there was nothing to prevent
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his handling them alone, and easily cutting the Southside Rail
road. Fortunately for our cause, Lee was so little like himself
as to allow the detachment of a considerable portion of his infan
try from the entrenchments on the evening of the thirtieth to
reenforce this position,— for the sake, probably of covering the
Southside Road ; to which however, this was not the only key.
Asking for the Sixth Corps shows a characteristic concen
tration of self-consciousness and disregard of the material
elements of the situation wholly unlike the habits of our com
manders in the Army of the Potomac. The Sixth Corps was
away on the right center of our lines,— even beyond Ord with
the Army of the James, and the roads were impracticable for a
rapid movement like that demanded. Grant’s predilection for
his forceful and brilliant cavalry commander could not overcome
the material difficulty of moving the Sixth Corps from its place
in the main line before Petersburg: he could only offer him the
Fifth. And Meade, with meekness quite suggestive of a newly
regenerate nature, seems to have offered no objection to this
distraction from the main objective, and this inauguration of
proceedings which repeatedly broke his army into detachments
serving under other commanders, and whereby in the popular
prestige and final honors of the campaign, the commander of
the Army of the Potomac found himself subordinated to the
cavalry commander of the newly made “Middle Military
Division.”
So while Warren was begging to be permitted to take his
corps through fields sodden saddle-girt deep with rain and mire,
and get across the right of Lee’s entrenched position, the pur
pose had already been formed of sending him and his corps to
try to force the enemy from the position where they were gath
ering for a stand after having forced his cavalry back upon its
base at the Boisseau Cross Road, and holding his main body in
active at Dinwiddie a whole day through. And after Warren
had accomplished all that he had undertaken in accordance
with the expressed wishes of his superiors, this purpose was to
be put into execution.
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I do not know that Warren was then aware of General
Grant’s loss of interest in this movement for the White Oak
Road since the new plan for Sheridan and the Fifth Corps.
Let us recall: at eight o’clock on the evening before, Meade had
sent Grant a despatch from Warren, suggesting this movement.
Meade forwarded it to Grant, with the remark : “ I think his
suggestion the best thing we can do under existing circum
stances;—that is, let Humphreys relieve Griffin, and let Warren
move on to the White Oak Road, and endeavor to turn the
enemy’s right.” To this Grant replied at 8.35, “ It will just
suit what I intended to propose ; to let Humphreys relieve
Griffin’s Division, and let that move further to the left. Warren
should get himself strong to-night. Orders being sent out
accordingly, and reported by Meade, General Grant replies late
that evening: “Your orders to Warren are right. I do not
expect him to advance in the morning. I supposed, however,
that he was now up to the White Oak Road. If he is not, I do
not want him to move up without further orders.”1 Meade
replies : “ He will not be allowed to advance unless you so
direct.” 2
It is impossible to think that Warren knew of this last word
of Grant on the subject of the White Oak Road ; but as we read
it now, it throws light on many things then “ dark.” It was
consistent with Grant’s new purpose; but it must have per
plexed Meade. And at the turn things took,— and men also,—
during the next forenoon and midday, what must have been the
vexation in Grant’s imperturbable mind, and the ebullition of
the few unsanctified remnants in Meade’s strained and re
strained spirit, those who knew them can freely imagine.
And as for Warren, when all this light broke upon him, in the
midst of his own hardly corrected reverses, into what sullen
depths his spirit must have been cast, to find himself liable
to a suit for breach of promise for going out to a clandestine
1 Records, Warren Court, Vol. II. p. 1242.
2 This is to be compared with Meade’s order of 10.30 A. M., March 31, through
General Webb: see ante, p.
.
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meeting with Robert Lee, when he was already engaged to
Philip Sheridan!
A new anxiety now arose. Just as we had got settled in our
position on the White Oak Road, heavy firing was heard from
the direction of Sheridan’s supposed position. This attracted
eager attention on our part; as with that open flank, Sheridan’s
movements were all important to us. At my headquarters we
had dismounted, but had not ventured yet to slacken girths. I
was standing on a little eminence, wrapped in thoughts of the
declining day and of these heavy waves of sound, which
doubtless had some message for us, soon or sometime, when
Warren came up with anxious earnestness of manner, and
asked me what I thought of this firing,— whether it was near
ing or receding. I believed it was receding towards Dinwiddie;
that was what had deepened my thoughts. Testing the opinion
by all tokens known to us, Warren came to the same conclu
sion. He then for a few minutes discussed the situation and
the question of possible duty for us in the absence of orders.
I expressed the opinion that Grant was looking out for Sheri
dan, and if help were needed, he would be more likely to send
Miles than us, as he well knew we were at a critical point, and
one important for his further plans as we understood them,
especially as Lee was known to be personally directing affairs
in our front. However, I thought it quite probable that we
should be blamed for not going to the support of Sheridan
even without orders, when we believed the enemy had got the
advantage of him. “Well, will you go?” Warren asked.
“ Certainly, General, if you think it best; but surely you do
not want to abandon this position.” At this point, General
Griffin came up and Warren asked him to send Bartlett’s
Brigade at once to threaten the rear of the enemy then press
ing upon Sheridan. That took away our best brigade. Bart
lett was an experienced and capable officer, and the hazardous
and trying task he had in hand would be well done.
Just after sunset Warren came out again, and we crept on our
hands and knees out to our extreme picket within two hundred
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yards of the enemy’s works, near the angle of the Claiborne
Road. There was some stir on our picket line, and the enemy
opened with musketry and artillery, which gave us all the infor
mation we wanted. That salient was well fortified. The artil
lery was protected by embrasures and little lunettes, so that
they could get a slant and cross-fire on any movement we
should make within their range.
I then began to put my troops into bivouac for the night, and
extended my picket around my left and rear to the White Oak
Road, where it joined the right of Ayres’ picket line. It was
an anxious night along that front. The darkness that deepened
around and over us was not much heavier than that which
shrouded our minds, and to some degree shadowed our spirits.
We did not know what was to come, or go. We were alert,—
Gregory and I,— on the picket line nearly all the night through.
Griffin came up to us at frequent intervals, wide awake as we
were.
In the meantime many things had been going on, and going
back. It came to us now, in the middle of the night, that
Sheridan had been attacked by Fitz Hugh Lee and Pickett’s
infantry, and driven pell-mell into Dinwiddie. He could hardly
hold himself there. The polarities of things were reversed.
Instead of admitting the Fifth Corps to the contemplated honor
of turning Lee’s right, or breaking through his lines, between
Dinwiddie and Five Forks, orders and entreaties came fast
and thick, in every sense of these terms, for the Fifth Corps to
leave the White Oak Road, Lee’s company, and everything
else, and rush back five miles to the rear, floundering through
the mire and dark, to help Sheridan stay where Pickett and
Fitz Hugh Lee had put him. Indeed, the suggestive informa
tion had leaked out from Grant’s headquarters that Sheridan
might be expected to retreat by way of the Vaughan Road,
quite to the rear of our entire left. This would leave all the
forces that had routed Sheridan at perfect liberty to fall upon
our exposed flank, and catch the Fifth Corps to be bandied to
and fro between them and the enemy in their fortifications, near
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at hand. By the time the Fifth Corps began to be picked to
pieces by divisions and brigades, and finally made a shuttle
cock as an entire organization, the situation of things and of
persons had very much changed.
At 6.30 P. M. General Warren received an order to send a
brigade to Sheridan’s relief by threatening the rear of the
enemy then in his front. Soon other orders followed,— the
last of these being to send the brigade by the Boydton Road.
This would have been quite a different matter. But Bartlett
had already been gone an hour when this order came, and to the
Crump Road, reaching this by aid of a cart track through woods
and mire. Of course, Warren could not recall Bartlett. But
to comply as nearly as possible with the order, he at once
directed General Pearson, who with three of Bartlett’s regi
ments was guarding the trains on the Boydton Road, to move
immediately down towards Dinwiddie. Pearson got to the cross
ing of the main stream of Gravelly Run, and finding that the
bridge was gone, and the stream not fordable, halted for orders.
But things were crowding thick and fast. Pearson’s orders were
countermanded, and orders came from army headquarters for
Griffin’s Division to go.
On the news of Sheridan’s discomfiture, Grant seems first to
have thought of Warren’s predicament. In a despatch to
Meade early in the evening he says: “ I would much rather
have Warren back on the Plank Road than to be attacked front
and rear where he is. He should entrench, front and rear of
his left, at least, and be ready to make a good fight of it if he is
attacked in the morning. We will make no offensive move
ment ourselves to-morrow.”
That was on the evening before the battle of Five Forks!
This was a significant despatch ; showing among other things
Grant’s intention of holding on, if possible, for the present at
least, to the White Oak Road, at the Claiborne salient; for that
was where our two advanced brigades of the Fifth Corps were
holding. This evidence has not been well appreciated by those
who have formed their judgment, or written the history, of
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those three days’ battles. And Meade had been trying all day
to get up entrenching tools and implements for making the
roads passable for wheels. A thousand men had been working
at this for the two days past.
At 8.30 came the notice,— communicated confidentially, I
remember,— that the whole army was going to contract its
lines. At nine o’clock came an order from Grant to Meade :
“Let Warren draw back at once to his position on the Boydton
Road, and send a division of infantry to Sheridan’s relief. The
troops to Sheridan should start at once, and go down the Boyd
ton Road.” Meade promptly sent orders for the corps to
retire, and for Griffin to go to Sheridan, and go at once.
Apparently nobody at general headquarters seems to have
remembered two incidents concerning the selection of Griffin’s
Division for this movement; first, that Bartlett of this division
was already by this time down upon the enemy’s rear, by
another, more direct, though more difficult road, and in a far
more effective position for the main purpose than could be
reached by the Boydton; and secondly, that the two remaining
brigades of this division were with me on and across the White
Oak Road,— the farthest off from the Boydton Road, and most
impeded by difficult ground, of any troops remaining on our
lines. Another circumstance, forgotten or ignored, was that
the bridge at the Plank Road crossing of Gravelly Run was
gone,1 and that the stream was not fordable for infantry. War
ren, in reporting his proceeding to comply with the order,
reported also the destruction of the bridge and his intention to
repair it; but this seems somehow from first to last, to have
added to the impatience felt towards him at those headquarters.
Grant had experienced a sudden change of mind,— a com
plete and decided one. His imperative order now received
meant giving up entirely the position we had just been ordered
1 Colonel Theodore Lyman, aid-de-camp on the staff of General Meade, wrote
in his diary on the night of March 30, “ Roads reduced to a hopeless pudding.
Gravelly Run swollen to treble its usual size, and Hatcher’s Run swept away its
bridges and required pontoons.” Records, Warren Court of Inquiry, Vol. I, p.
519.
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to entrench, across the hard-won White Oak Road. Within
ten minutes from the receipt of this order, Warren directed his
division commanders to gather up their pickets and all outlying
troops, and take their position on the Boydton Road. Griffin
was directed to recall Bartlett and then move down the Plank
Road and report to Sheridan. But as it would take time for
Griffin to get his scattered division together and draw back
through the mud and darkness to the Boydton Road, ready to
start for Sheridan, Warren, anxious to fulfil the spirit and
object of the order, rather than render a mechanical obedience
to the letter of it, sends his nearest division, under Ayres, the
strong, stern old soldier of the Mexican war, to start at once for
Sheridan. Meantime, the divisions of Griffin and Crawford
were taking steps to obey the order to mass on the Boydton
Road. For my own part, I did not move a man ; wishing to
give my men all possible time for rest, until Bartlett should
arrive, who must come past my rear.
This was the situation when at half past ten in the evening
came an order throwing everything into a complete muddle.
It was from Meade to Warren : “ Send Griffin promptly as
ordered by the Boydton Plank Road, but move the balance of
your command by the road Bartlett is on, and strike the enemy
in rear, who is between him and Dinwiddie. Should the enemy
turn on you, your line of retreat will be by J. M. Brooks’ and
R. Boisseau’s on Boydton Road. You must be very prompt in
this movement, and get the forks of the road at Brooks’ so as
to open to Boisseau’s. Don’t encumber yourself with anything
that will impede your progress, or prevent your moving in any
direction across the country.” The grim humor of the last
suggestion was probably lost on Warren, in his present distrac
tion. “ Moving in any direction ” in the blackness of darkness
across that country of swamps and sloughs and quicksands,
would be a comedy with the savage forces of nature and of
man in pantomime, and a spectacle for the laughter of the gods.
Nor was there much left to encumber ourselves with,— more
especially in the incident of food. Grant had been very anxious
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about rations for us ever since early morning, when he had
said that although there were to be no movements that day, the
Fifth Corps must be supplied with three days’ rations more.
But all the day no rations had been got up. Indeed, I do not
know how they could have found us, or got to us if they had.
Grant had repeated imperative orders to Meade to spare no
exertions in getting rations forward to the Fifth Corps ; where
upon Meade, who had himself eaten salt with his old Fifth
Corps, gave orders to get rations to us anyway ; — if not pos
sible for trains, then by pack-mules. The fortunate and pictur
esque conjuncture was that some few rations were thus got up
by the flexible and fitting donkey-train, while we were flounder
ing and plunging from every direction for our rendezvous on
the Boydton Road or elsewhere, just at that witching hour of
the night when the flying cross-shuttle of oscillating military
orders was weaving such a web of movements between the
unsubstantial footing of earth and the more substantial black
ness of the midnight sky, matched only by the benighted mind.
By this order the Corps was to be turned end for end, and
inside out. Poor Warren might be forgiven if at such an order
his head swam and his wits collapsed. He responds thus,—
and has been much blamed for it by those under canvas, then
and since; — “I issued my orders on General Webb’s first des
patch to fall back ; which made the divisions retire in the order
of Ayres, Crawford, and Griffin, which was the order they could
most rapidly move in. I cannot change them to-night without
producing confusion that will render all my operations nugatory.
I will now send General Ayres to General Sheridan, and take
General Griffin and General Crawford to move against the
enemy, as this last despatch directs I should. I cannot accom
plish the object of the orders I have received.1 ”
But what inconceivable addition to the confusion came in the
following despatch from General Meade to Warren at one o’clock
1See this despatch of 10.55 P. M. March 31st. War Records, Serial 97, p. 367.
General Warren in his testimony before the Court of Inquiry, claimed that the
word “ Otherwise ” should be prefixed to the last sentence of this order, as it was
dictated. Records, page 730, note.
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at night: “ Would not time be gained by sending troops by the
Quaker Road ? Sheridan cannot maintain himself at Dinwiddie without reenforcements, and yours are the only ones that
can be sent. Use every exertion to get the troops to him as
soon as possible. If necessary, send troops by both roads, and
give up the rear attack.”
Rapidly changing plans and movements in effecting the sin
gle purpose for which battle is delivered are what a soldier must
expect; and the ability to form them wisely and promptly illus
trates and tests military capacity. But the conditions in this
case rendered the execution of these peculiarly perplexing.
Orders had to pass through many hands ; and in the difficulties
of delivery, owing to distance and the nature of the ground, the
situation which called for them had often entirely changed.
Hence some discretion as to details in executing a definite pur
pose must be accorded to subordinate commanders.
Look for a moment at a summary of the orders Warren
received that evening, after we had reached the White Oak
Road, affecting his command in detail.
1. To send a brigade to menace the enemy’s rear before
Sheridan.
But he had already of his own accord sent Bartlett’s Brigade,
of Griffin’s Division, the nearest troops, by the nearest way.
2. To send this brigade by the Boydton Road instead of the
Crump.
This was a very different direction, and of different tactical
effect. But impossible to recall Bartlett, Warren sent Pearson,
already on the Boydton Road, with a detachment of Bartlett’s
Brigade.
3. To send Griffin’s Division by the Boydton Road to Sher
idan, and draw back the whole corps to that road.
Griffin’s Division being widely and far scattered, and impos
sible to be collected for hours, Warren sends Ayres’ Division,
nearest, and most disengaged.
4. To send Ayres and Crawford by the way Bartlett had
gone, and insisting on Griffin’s going by Boydton Road.
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This would cause Ayres and Bartlett to exchange places,
crossing each other in a long, difficult and needless march.
5. Ayres having gone, according to Warren’s orders, Griffin
and Crawford to go by Bartlett’s way.
But Griffin had sent for Bartlett to withdraw from his position
and join the division ready to mass on the Boydton Road.
It is difficult to keep a clear head in trying to see into this
muddle now: we can imagine the state of Warren’s mind. But
this was not all. Within the space of two hours, Warren received
orders involving important movements for his entire corps, in
four different directions. These came in rapid succession, and
in the following order :
1. To entrench where he was (on the White Oak Road),
and be ready for a fight in the morning. (This from Grant.)
2. To fall back with the whole corps from the White Oak
Road to the Boydton, and send a division by this road to relieve
Sheridan. (This from Grant.)
3. Griffin to be pushed down the Boydton Road, but the rest
of the corps — Ayres and Crawford,— to go across the fields to
the Crump Road, the way Bartlett had gone, and attack the
enemy in rear who were opposing Sheridan. (This from Meade.)
This required a movement in precisely the opposite direction
from that indicated in the preceding order,— which was now
partly executed. Ayres bad already started.
4. Meade’s advice to send these troops by the Quaker Road,
(ten miles around), and give up the rear attack.
5. To these may be added the actual final movement, which
was that Ayres went down the Boydton Road, and Griffin and
Crawford went by the “ dirt ” road across the country to the
Crump Road as indicated in Meade’s previous orders.
There is one thing more. General Grant thought it neces
sary, in order to make sure that Sheridan should have complete
and absolute command of these troops,— to send a special mes
sage asking Meade to make that distinct announcement to
Sheridan. (Despatch of 10.34 P. M., March 31.) To this Meade
replies that he had ordered the Fifth Corps to Sheridan, and

THE WHITE OAK ROAD.

37

adds, “ The messenger to Sheridan has gone now, so that I can
not add what you desire about his taking command, but I take it
for granted he will do so, as he is senior. I will instruct War
ren to report to him.”
So General Grant’s solicitude lest Sheridan should forget to
assume command, as the regulations clearly provided, was faith
fully ministered to by that expert in nervous diseases,— Meade.
The orders which came to General Warren that night were to
an amazing degree confused and conflicting. This is charging
no blame on any particular person. We will call it, if you please,
the fault of circumstances. But of course, the responsibility for
the evil effects of such conditions must naturally, in military
usage and ethics, rest upon the officer receiving them. And
when he is not allowed to use his judgment as to the details of
his own command, it makes it very hard for him, sometimes.
Indeed it is not very pleasant to be a subordinate officer ; espec
ially if one is also at the same time, a commanding officer.
But in this case I think the trouble was the result of other
recognizable contributory circumstances, — if I might not say,
causes.
1. The awkwardness of having in the field so many supe
rior, or rather coordinate commanders : Grant, commanding the
the United States Armies, with his headquarters immediately
with those of the commander of the Army of the Potomac ;
unintentionally but necessarily detracting from the dignity and
independence of this subordinate ; Meade, commanding the
Army of the Potomac, only two corps of which were with him,
— the two others being on the extreme right of our entrenched
lines, with Ord and the Army of the James between them ;
Sheridan, with an independent cavalry command, guaranteed so
to remain, yet in such touch with the Fifth Corps that there
was danger of more friction than support between the com
manders.1
1 How serious the practical effect was of having orders or despatches on the
same point from several superior or coequal commanders, is brought out by Gen
eral Sheridan’s answers under close and almost " cross” examination at the
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2. A double objective : one point being Sheridan’s indepen
dent operations to cut the enemy’s communications ; the other,
the turning of Lee’s right and breaking up his army by our
infantry. It is true this double objective was in terms given up
when Sheridan was informed all were to “ act together as one
army ; ” but the trouble is, this precept was never strictly car
ried into effect; inasmuch as General Sheridan was not inclined
to serve under any other commander but Grant, and it became
difficult to humor him in this without embarrassing other oper
ations. And, as matter of fact, the communications were not cut,
either on the Southside or the Danville Roads, until our infantry
struck them,— Sheridan, however, contributing in his own way
to this result.
3. These supreme commanders being at such distance from
the fields of operation on the thirty-first of March, that it was
impossible to have a complete mutual understanding when
orders were to be put into effect. Nor could they make them
selves alike familiar with material conditions, such as grounds
and bridges, or with the existing state of things at important
junctures, owing to rapid, unforeseen changes.
4. Time lost, and sequence confused, by the difficulty of get
ting over the ground to carry orders, or to obey them ; owing to
the condition of the roads, or lack of them, and the extreme
darkness of the night.
We had very able officers of the general staff, at each head
quarters ; otherwise things might have been worse. The respon
sibilities, labors, tests and perils,— physical and moral,— that
Warren Court of Inquiry. See Records, pages 64-73. As to the embarrassments
experienced by General Meade in giving orders to his subordinates, and by General
Warren in handling his own corps, an example is seen in the following note to
General Sheridan by General Webb, chief of Meade’s staff, on the evening of
March 31. Consider especially the last sentence.
“ Gen. Meade has directed all the spare ambulances he can get hold of to go
down to Dinwiddie. Bartlett’s Brigade is at Crump’s house, on Gravelly Run.
Griffin, with three brigades, is ordered down Boydton Plank, to attack in rear of
force menacing you. Gen. Grant is requested to authorize the sending of War
ren’s two other divisions down the dirt road past Crump’s, to hold and cover that
road, and to attack at daylight.”
Thus the Fifth Corps had three immediate commanders to order its divisions.
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often fall upon staff officers in the field, are great and trying.
Upon their intelligence, alertness, accuracy of observation and
report, their promptitude, energy and endurance, the fate of a
corps or a field, may depend.
The frictions, mischances and misunderstandings of all these
circumstances falling across Warren’s path, might well have
bewildered the brightest mind, and rendered nugatory the most
faithful intentions.
Meantime, it may well be conceived we who held that extreme
front line had an anxious night. Griffin was with me most of
the time, and in investigating the state of things in front of our
picket lines some time after midnight, we discovered that the
enemy were carefully putting out their fires all along their own
visible front. Griffin regards this as evidence of a contemplated
attack on us, and he sends this information and suggestion to
headquarters, and thus adds a new element to the already wellshaken mixture of uncertainty and seeming cross-purposes.
But with us, the chief result was an anxiety that forbade a
moment’s relaxation from intense vigilance.
Meantime Ayres had kept on, according to Warren’s first
orders to him, getting a small instalment of rations on the way,
and arriving at Warren’s “Bridge of Sighs” on the Gravelly
Run, just as it was ready, at about two o’clock in the morn
ing, whence he pushed down the Plank Road and reported to
Sheridan before Dinwiddie just as the day was dawning.
Whereupon he was informed that he advanced two miles further
than General Sheridan desired, and he had to face about
his exhausted men and go back to a cross road which he had
passed for the very sufficient reason that Sheridan had no staff
officer there to guide him where he was wanted.
At three o’clock I had got in my pickets, which were re
placed by Crawford’s, and let my men rest as quietly as possible,
knowing there would be heavy burdens laid on them in the morn
ing. For, while dividing the sporadic mule-rations, word came to
us that the Fifth Corps, as an organization, was to report to
Sheridan at once and be placed under his orders. We kept our
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heads and hearts as well as we could ; for we thought both would
be needed. It was near daylight when my command,— all
there was of Griffin’s Division then left on the front,— drew out
from the White Oak Road; Crawford’s Division replacing us,
to be brought off carefully under Warren’s eye. We shortly
picked up Bartlett’s returning brigade, halted, way-worn and
jaded with marching and countermarching, and struck off in
the direction of the Boisseau houses and the Crump Road, fol
lowing their heavy tracks in the mud and mire marking a way
where before there was none; one of those recommended
“ directions across the country,” which this veteran brigade
found itself thus compelled to travel for the third time in lieu
of rest or rations, churning the sloughs and quicksands with
emotions and expressions that could be conjectured only by a
veteran of the Old Testament dispensation.
I moved with much caution in approaching doubtful vicinities,
throwing forward an advance-guard, which as we expected to
encounter the enemy in force, I held immediately in my own
hand. Griffin followed at the head of my leading brigade,
ready for whatever should happen. Arrived at the banks of
the south branch of Gravelly Run, where Bartlett had made his
dispositions the night before, from a mile in our front the glit
ter of advancing cavalry caught my eye, saber-scabbards and
belt-brasses flashing back the level rays of the rising sun. Be
lieving this to be nothing else than the rebel cavalry we expected
to find somewhere before us, we made dispositions for instant
attack. But the steady on-coming soon revealed the blue of
our own cavalry, with Sheridan’s weird battle-flag in the van.
I reduce my front, get into the road again, and hardly less
anxious than before move forward to meet Sheridan.
We come face to face. The sunlight helps out the expres
sion of each a little. I salute : “ I report to you, General,
with the head of Griffin’s Division.” The courteous recognition
is given. Then, the stern word, more charge than question :
“ Why did you not come before ? Where is Warren ? ” “ He is
at the rear of the column, sir.” “That is where I expected to
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find him. What is he doing there ? ” “ General, we are with
drawing from the White Oak Road, where we fought all day.
General Warren is bringing off his last division, expecting an
attack.” Griffin comes up. My responsibility is at an end. I
feel better. I am directed to mass my troops by the roadside.
We are not sorry for that. Ayres soon comes up on the Brooks
Road. Crawford arrives at length, and masses his troops also,
near the J. Boisseau house, at the junction of the Five Forks
Road. We were on the ground the enemy had occupied the
evening before. It was Bartlett’s outstretched line in their
rear, magnified by the magic lens of night into the sem
blance of the whole Fifth Corps right upon them, which induced
them to withdraw from Sheridan’s front and fall back upon Five
Forks.1 So after all Bartlett had as good as fought a success
ful battle, by a movement which might have been praised as
Napoleonic had other fortunes favored.
We cannot wonder that Sheridan might not be in the best of
humor that morning. It is not pleasant for a temperament like
his to experience the contradiction of having the ardent expec
tations of himself and his superior turned into disaster and re
treat. It was but natural that he should be incensed against
Warren. For not deeply impressed with the recollection that
he had found himself unable to go to the assistance of Warren
as he had been ordered to do, his mind retained the irritation
of vainly expecting assistance from Warren the moment he
desired it, without considering what Warren might have on hand
at the same time. Nor could Warren be expected to be in a
very exuberant mood after such a day and night. Hence the
auguries for the cup of loving-kindness on this crowning day of
Five Forks were not favorable. Each of them was under
the shadow of yesterday: one, of a mortifying repulse; the
other, of thankless success. Were Warren a mind-reader he
would have known it was a time to put on a warmer manner
towards Sheridan. For a voice of doom was in the air.
1 Testimony of Gen. Fitz Hugh Lee, Warren Court, Vol. I, p. 481.
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That morning, two hours after the head of the Fifth Corps
column had reported to General Sheridan, an officer of the
artillery staff had occasion to find where the Fifth Corps was,—
evidently not knowing that under orders from superiors it had
been like “ all Gaul” divided into three parts, if not four
quarters,— and went for that purpose to the point where War
ren had had his headquarters the night before. Warren, in
leaving at daybreak, had not removed his headquarters’ material;
but in consideration for his staff, who had been on severe duty
all night, told Colonel Locke, Captain Melcher and a few others
to stay and take a little rest before resuming the tasking duties
of the coming day. It was about nine o’clock in the morning
when the artillery officer reached Warren’s old headquarters,
and suddenly rousing Colonel Locke asked where the Fifth
Corps was. Locke, so abruptly wakened, his sound sleep bridg
ing the break of his last night’s consciousness, rubbed his eyes,
and with dazed simplicity answered that when he went to sleep
the Fifth Corps was halted to build a bridge at Gravelly Run
on the Plank Road. No time was lost in reporting this at
headquarters, without making further inquiries as to the where
abouts of the Fifth Corps,— now for three hours with Sheridan
on the Five Forks Road. Thereupon General Grant forthwith
sends General Babcock to tell General Sheridan that “if he
had any reason to be dissatisfied with General Warren,” or as
it has since been put, “if in his opinion the interests of the
service gave occasion for it,” he might relieve him from com
mand of his corps.1
“ So do we walk amidst the precipices of our fate.”
Records, Warren Court; testimony of Capt. Warner, page 38; of General
Babcock, page 901 ; also of General Sheridan, page 93; and General Grant,
page 1028.
General Grant afterwards stated that although this information about the bridge
was the occasion, it was not the reason, of his authorization of General Sheridan
to depose General Warren from his command. Ibid, page 1030.
That bridge,— for a non-existent one,— had a strange potency. Considering
how various were the tests of which it was made the instrument, it well rivals that
other “pons a sinorum” of Euclid; and certainly the associated triangle was of
surpassing attributes ; for the squares described on the two “ legs ” of it were far
more than equal to that so laboriously executed on its hypothenuse.
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All was left to Sheridan’s judgment and feeling. The power
was his. Still one must justify himself in the exercise of rights
and powers. We too must realize the situation. Sheridan, with
his habit of intense, concentrated purpose, and indomitable,
virile will, was indispensable to Grant in the field. None other
of the commanders reminded us of Attila, king of the Huns.
Warren, with his bright mind, analytic rather than synthetic,
seeing things in their details, quick to seize a situation, yet
lacking that tornado force that sweeps only the path before it,
was scarcely suited to wield the thunderbolt of Sheridan. He
was a good fighter; but he thought of too many things.
General Warren has been blamed, and perhaps justly, for
attacking with a single division on the White Oak Road. As
he denies that he intended this for an attack, we will put it that
he is blamed for not sufficiently supporting a reconnaissance; so
that the repulse of it involved the disorderly retreat of two
divisions of his corps. It is to be said to this that he very
shortly more than recovered this ground, driving the enemy
with serious loss into his works. But at the worst, was that a
fault hitherto unknown among corps or army commanders ?
Sheridan attacked with a single division when he was ordered
to take Five Forks on the day before, and was driven back by
a very inferior force to that he had in hand. He was not blamed,
although the result of this failure was the next day’s dire mis
fortunes. And on this very day, driven back discomfited into
Dinwiddie, he was not blamed; he was praised,— and in this
high fashion. General Grant in his official report and subsequent
histories speaking of this repulse says : “ Here General Sheri
dan displayed great generalship. Instead of retreating with
his whole command on the main army, to tell the story of
superior forces encountered, he deployed bis cavalry on foot,
leaving only mounted men enough to take charge of the horses.
This compelled the enemy to deploy over a vast extent of
wooded and broken country and made his progress slow.”
If Warren had the benefit of this definition of great general
ship, he might have known better what to do on the White Oak
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Road. Perhaps also Pickett and Fitz Hugh Lee might have
profited by this implied rebuke for allowing themselves to be so
“ bluffed,” and “compelled to deploy,” instead of following their
old fashion of concentrating on a vulnerable point and launch
ing javelin-like through their enemy’s lines. Perhaps, however,
they had a wise diffidence of so exhibiting themselves before
our stalwart dismounted cavalry, having a well grounded opin
ion also that our cavalry breech-loaders, Spencers and repeaters
were quite a match for the unwieldy muzzle-loading Richmond
or Springfield rifles, and that for all purposes except running, a
man on two legs is better than a man on four.
Warren was deposed from his command at Five Forks mainly,
I have no doubt, under the irritation at his being slow in get
ting up to Sheridan the night before from the White Oak Road.
But he was working and fighting all day to hold the advanced
left flank of Grant’s chosen position, and harrassedall night with
conflicting and stultifying orders, while held between two
threatening forces ; his left with nothing to prevent Lee’s
choice troops disengaged from Sheridan from striking it a crush
ing blow; and on the other hand, Lee himself in person, evi
dently regarding this the vital point, with all the troops he could
gather there, ready to deliver on that little front a mortal stroke.
For it is not true as has been stated by high authority, that
any troops that had fought us on the White Oak Road had gone
to Pickett’s support at Five Forks that day. And when in the
gray of the morning he moved out to receive Sheridan’s not
over-gracious welcome to the Fifth Corps, Warren withdrew
from under the very eyes of Lee, his rear division faced by the
rear rank, ready for the not-improbable attack, himself the last
to leave the field that might have been so glorious,— now fated
to be forgotten.
It may be presumption to offer opinions on the operations of
that day under such commanders. But having ventured some
statements of fact that seem like criticism, it may be required
of me to suggest what better could have been done, or to show
reason why what was done was not the best. I submit there
fore, the following remarks :
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1. Five Forks should have been occupied on the thirtieth
as Grant had ordered, and when there was nothing formid
able to oppose. The cavalry could then easily strike the
Southside Railroad, and the Fifth and Second Corps be ex
tended to envelope the entire right of the enemy’s position,
and at the opportune moment the general assault could be suc
cessfully made, as Grant had contemplated when he formed his
purpose of acting as one army with all his forces in the field.
2. This plan failing, there were two openings promising
good results ; one, to let the cavalry linger about Dinwiddie
and threaten Lee’s communications, so as to draw out a large
body of his troops from the entrenchments into the open where
they could be attacked on equal ground, and his army be at
least materially crippled ; the other, to direct the assault
immediately on the right of Lee’s entrenched lines on the Fifth
Corps front,— the cavalry, of course, sweeping around their
flank so as to take them in reverse, while the infantry concen
trated on their weakest point.
A third thing was to do a little of both ; — and this is what
we seem to have adopted, playing from one to the other, fitfully
and indecisively, more than one day and night.
Beyond doubt it was Grant’s plan when he formed his new
purpose on the night of the twenty-ninth, to turn the enemy
on their Claiborne flank, and follow this up sharply by vigor
ous assault on the weakest point of their main line in front of
Petersburg. The positions taken up by the Fifth and Second
Corps are explained by such a purpose, and the trying tasks
and hard fighting required of them for the first three days are
therein justified. The evidence of this purpose is ample.1
1 As evidence that a general attack was intended, we may cite the order sus
pending it. It is from Grant to Meade, received by the latter at about one
o’clock in the morning of the thirty-first. “ I think it has now got to be so late
for getting out orders, that it would be doubtful whether Wright could be fully
cooperated with by all parts of the army if he was to assault as he proposes. . . .
You might notify him to arrange his preliminaries and see if Parke can get ready
also; and if so, give him definite orders as soon as it is known. I will telegraph
to Ord and ascertain if he can get ready. Warren and Humphreys would have
nothing to do but to push forward where they are. . . .” But a later order to
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Everything was made ready, but the attack was suspended.
I am not upon the inquiry whether this was postponed until
Sheridan should have done something; my point is that if, or
when, this purpose was abandoned for another line of action,
other dispositions should have been promptly made, and infor
mation given to officers charged with responsibilities and
environed with difficulties as Warren was, so that they could
catch the change of key. Grant had set the machinery in
motion for the White Oak Road, and it was hard and slow work
to reverse it when he suddenly changed his tactics, and resolved
to concentrate on Sheridan. Why was the Fifth Corps ad
vanced after Ayres’ repulse ? The “ reconnaissance ” had been
made ; the enemy’s position and strength ascertained, and our
party had returned to the main line. There was no justification
in pressing so hard on that point of the White Oak Road, at such
costs, unless we meant to follow up this attack to distinct and
final results. This may possibly be laid to Warren’s charge in
his anxiety and agony to “ save the honor of the Fifth Corps.”
But this was not essential to the grander tactics of the field.
I sometimes blame myself,— if I may presume to exalt myself
into such high company,— for going beyond the actual recovery
of Ayres’ lost field, and pressing on for the White Oak Road,
when it was not readily permitted me to do so. It may be that
my too youthful impetuosity about the White Oak Road got
Warren into this false position across this road, where all night,
possessed with seven devils, we tried to get down to Sheridan
and Five Forks. But I verily believed that what we wanted
was the enemy’s right, on the White Oak Road. How could
we then know Grant’s change of purpose? However, it was
all a mistake if we were going to abandon everything before
morning. We should have been withdrawn at once, and put in
position for the new demonstration. That order to mass on the
Meade reads : “You may notify Parke and Wright that they need not assault in
the morning. ... I have pretty much made up my mind what to do, and will
inform you in the morning what it is.” Rebellion Records, Serial 97, pages 285,
286, and following. But the understanding of these orders is made difficult by
their not being arranged in the order of their delivery.
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Boydton Road, received at about ten o’clock at night, should
have been given much earlier,— as soon as we could safely
move away from the presence of the enemy,— if we were to
reenforce Sheridan on his own lines.
3. But better than this, as things were, it would have been
to leave a small force on the White Oak Road to occupy the
enemy’s attention, and move the whole Fifth Corps to attack
the rear of the enemy then confronting Sheridan, as Meade sug
gested to Grant at ten o’clock at night.1 It would have been as
easy for us all to go, as for Bartlett. With such force we would
not have stopped on Gravelly Run, but would have struck
Pickett’s and Fitz Hugh Lee’s rear, and compelled them to
make a bivouac under our supervision, on that ground where
they had “ deployed.” They would not have been able to
retire in the morning, as they were constrained to do by Bart
lett’s demonstration.
4. No doubt it was right to save the honor of the cavalry
before Dinwiddie, as of the Fifth Corps before the White Oak
Road; and Sheridan’s withdrawal to that place having lured out so
large a force,— six thousand infantry and four thousand cav
alry,— from a good military position to the exposed one at Five
Forks, it was good tactics to fall upon them and smash them up.
Lee, strangely enough, did not think we would do this ; for he
held himself in his main lines on his right, as the point requir
ing his presence ; and sent reenforcements from there for his
imperiled detachment only so late that they did not report until
after the struggle at Five Forks was all over.
But we owe much to fortune. Had the enemy on the thirtyfirst let Fitz Hugh Lee with his cavalry reenforcements occupy
Sheridan, and rushed Pickett’s division with the two brigades of
Johnson’s down the White Oak Road upon the flank of the mo
mentarily demoralized Fifth Corps, while Hunton and Gracie
and Wallace and Wise were on its front, we should have had
trouble. Or had they, after repulsing Sheridan towards even
ing, left the cavalry deployed across his front to baffle his
1 Records, Warren Court, p. 1251.
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observation, while Pickett should make the converse movement
on us to ours on him with Bartlett’s Brigade, and come across
from that Crump Road to fall upon our untenable flank position,
it would have opened all eyes to the weakness and error of our
whole situation. What would have become of us, some higher
power than any there only could say.
The battle of Five Forks was also the battle of the White
Oak Road, on an extended front, in an accidental and isolated
position, and at a delayed hour. It was successful, owing to
the character of the troops, and the skill and vigor of the com
mander. Appomattox was a glorious result of strong pushing
and hard marching. But both could have been forestalled, and all
that fighting, together with that at Sailor’s Creek, High Bridge
and Farmville have been concentrated in one grand assault,
of which the sharp-edged line along the White Oak Road would
have been one blade of the shears, and Ord and Wright and Parke
on the main line the other, and the hard and costly ten days’
chase and struggle would have been spared so many noblemen.
Lee would not have got a day’s start of us in the desperate race.
Sheridan cutting the enemy’s communications and rolling up
their scattering fugitives would have shown his great qualities,
and won conspicuous, though not supreme honors. Warren
would have shared the glories of his corps. Humphreys and
Wright with their veterans of the Second and Sixth, whose
superb action compelled the first flag of truce contemplating
Lee’s surrender, would not have stood idly around the head
quarters’ flag of the Army of the Potomac, with Longstreet’s
right wing brought to bay before them, waiting till Lee’s final
answer to Grant should come through Sheridan to the Fifth
Corps front, where Ord, of the Army of the James, commanded.
And Meade, the high-born gentleman and high-borne soldier,
would have been spared the slight of being held back with the
main body of his army, while the laurels were bestowed by chance
or choice, which had been so fairly won by that old army in long
years of heroic patience in well-doing and suffering; — might
have been spared the after humiliation of experiencing in his
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own person how fortune and favor preside in the final distribu
tion of honors in a Country’s recognition.
So we leave again, — the Fifth Corps and the White Oak
Road. But it was by one of those strange overrulings of Prov
idence, or what some might call poetic justice, and some the
irony of history, that it befell Sheridan to have with him at Five
Forks and at Appomattox Court House, — not slow nor incon
spicuous,— the deprecated, but inexpugnable old Fifth Corps.

ERRATA.
Page 28, fifth line from bottom, seventh word, for left read right.
Page 29, sixth line from bottom, eighth word, for his read Sheridan's.
Page
last figure in footnote, for 220 read 15.

